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Contracts, Sales, and Agency 
WENDELL F. GRIMES 
The subject matter of this chapter covers a broad field in the tradi-
tional scope of law school courses. In practice, the material overlaps 
to an extent that makes it difficult to justify separate treatment. Con-
tract law questions may arise in regard to a sale, and most agency 
problems arise in commercial transactions. It was therefore decided 
that at least for the purposes of the 1954 SURVEY the three subjects 
could best be presented in one chapter. 
§5.1. Offer and acceptance. In Kuzmeskus v. Pickup Motor CO.l the 
Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed the oft-repeated rule2 that an offer 
revoked prior to any purported acceptance by the offeree cuts off the 
offeree's power to ripen prior negotiations into a binding contract. 
The plaintiff, suing for the return of a $1000 deposit, was the suc-
cessful bidder for a contract to supply school bus transportation, one of 
the provisions of which required the plaintiff to transport the children 
in five new school buses. The defendant, a dealer in buses, had as-
sisted the plaintiff in securing the contract. Within an hour after 
the plaintiff had been notified of the acceptance of his bid, the de-
fendant through its general manager and a salesman called upon the 
plaintiff, at which time the parties orally determined the price, model, 
and date of delivery of the buses. Thereupon the defendant's general 
manager presented to the plaintiff five order forms which the defend-
ant had prepared and which the plaintiff then executed. One of the 
orders was then canceled. Each order form contained the following: 
"Enter my order for one . . . bus. . . . This order is not binding un-
less authorized by an officer of the company ... " Below the line for 
the signature of the purchaser appeared the words "authorized by" 
and a line for a signature. The plaintiff delivered to the general man-
ager and salesman a check in the amount of $1000, representing a de-
posit of $250 on each of the four buses ordered. Less than a day 
later, and before signature by a company officer, the plaintiff first 
orally and later by telegram canceled the orders and requested the re-
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fund of his deposit. The Court, holding that the plaintiff was entitled 
to the return of his deposit, ruled, first, that the order forms were not 
memoranda of a valid oral contract previously entered into, but con-
stituted invitations for offers from the purchaser; and second, that 
since the order forms themselves indicated the mode of acceptance, 
the cancellation of the plaintiff's offer prior to signed authorization 
by a company officer rebutted the defendant's contention that even if a 
contract had not previously come into existence, the delivery of the or-
der forms to the defendant's general manager by the plaintiff had rip-
ened the negotiations into a contract. 
The Court's rulings are both sound. The fact that the defendant 
had previously prepared and had presented written order forms to be 
executed by the plaintiff seems amply to demonstrate the lack of an 
intent that oral negotiations and promises should constitute the con-
tract. Rather, the facts bring the case squarely within the rule that 
no contract exists if the intent of the parties is that none shall exist 
until the agreement be memorialized in writing.3 
The Court is also on firm ground in ruling that the plaintiff's deliv-
ery of the order form did not complete a contract. The defendant 
clearly indicated an intent not to make a binding promise until the 
conditions on its own order form were performed. In such case 
acceptance of the delivery of the order form is merely an indication of 
present intent to be bound only when a further expression of assent is 
given by signature of a company officer. Acceptance of delivery of the 
order form would not be a present promise, hence there could be no 
presently binding contract.4 The fact that the defendant's general 
manager was the person to whom the order was delivered does not aid 
the defendant. Even if the general manager were an officer of the 
company with authority to execute sales, the order form required his 
signature as the only indication of assent on the part of the company 
to make a presently binding promise. 
§5.2. Terms of the contract: Usage. Usage is a tool employed in 
interpreting the meaning of words.! It applies as a rule of interpreta-
tion where parties to a contract are of the same occupation.2 Where 
parties are of the same occupation or engaged in the same trade, and 
usage in such trade is generally known by those in the trade, a party 
to a contract in such circumstances is charged with knowledge of it, 
with the result that actual knowledge of usage by such a party is im-
material.3 
The above rules were applied in Berwick & Smith Co. v. Salem 
Press, Inc.4 The plaintiff, a book printer for many years, sent to the 
defendant's general manager an estimate of the cost of printing and 
• Id. §26. 
• Id. §58. 
§5.2. 11 Restatement, Contracts §246, Comment a (1932). 
2 Id. §§24 7, 248. 
B Ibid. 
'1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 217,117 N.E.2d 825. 
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binding the defendant's book. The book was in two volumes. The 
defendant's general manager was familiar with the printing of books 
even though he had never had a book printed before. That part of 
the estimate concerned with binding the books read "5000 copies @ 
.561, 10,000 copies @ .538." A contract was entered into on the basis 
of the estimate. The plaintiff, contending that the bid was on a per 
volume basis, introduced evidence tending to show that estimates on 
cost of binding were on a per volume basis and that such is a well-rec-
ognized custom in the book production business. The defendant 
moved for a directed verdict, contending that the bid was on the basis 
of a set of two volumes. The Court held that the plaintiff's evidence 
was sufficient to take the case to the jury. It ruled that, inasmuch as 
there was ambiguity in the terms of the contract, evidence of usage was 
correctly admitted. The Court also ruled that there was no necessity 
on the part of the plaintiff to prove actual knowledge of the usage on 
the part of the defendant where both parties were engaged in the same 
trade. The statement in the decision, "Where the usage is estab-
lished the presumption is that the parties contracted with reference to 
it," is questionable. The Court could have been clearer in pointing 
out that usage once established makes immaterial any evidence as to 
knowledge of one of the contracting parties, rather than confusing the 
issue with the phraseology of presumptions. 
§5.3. The Statute of Frauds and allegations of agency. N on-
adherence to the requirements of the Statute of Frauds in real estate 
contracts provides a fertile field of litigation that could be avoided by 
proper draftsmanship. Much of the litigation in this area may be due 
to the fact that in many instances the original agreement is not pre-
pared by an attorney. Although the layman generally knows that real 
estate agreements have to be in writing, his unfamiliarity with the 
rules governing the content of the writing and the signatures required 
gives rise to the frequent litigation that flavors this area of contract 
law. Cluff v. Picardi! is such a case. The buyer sued the sellers for 
specific performance, alleging in the bill an agreement with the sellers, 
"a memorandum of which agreement is hereto annexed and marked 
'A.''' The land in question was formerly owned by a wife, who by 
will left a two-thirds undivided interest therein to her daughter, Kath-
leen Picardi, and the remaining undivided one third to her surviving 
husband. After the wife's death suit was brought against the daugh-
ter and the husband. The memorandum above noted read, "I Kath-
leen Picardi, hereby sell to [buyer] the land ... formerly the home 
of my mother for the sum of thirty-seven hundred dollars of which this 
is a receipt for two hundred dollars as a down deposit. The re-
mainder to be paid upon the settlement of the estate. Mrs. Kathleen 
Picardi Administrator." The case was presented to the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court on appeal by the plaintiff from a decree sustaining the 
defendants' demurrer and dismissing the bill. 
§5.3. 11954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 349, lIS N.E.2d 753. 
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After first deciding that a demurrer was the proper procedural tool 
to test the sufficiency of the bill, which pleaded an oral contract 
with an alleged memorandum of it, a majority of the Court held the 
memorandum insufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The Court 
reasoned that the agreement was between the buyer and the two sellers 
jointly and that the memorandum contained nothing in it to bind the 
surviving husband. The Court asserted that if the bill had alleged 
that the daughter was signing as agent for her father, the memoran-
dum would have been sufficient. Such authority to act as agent for her 
father in signing the memorandum would not have to be in writing.2 
The memorandum, assuming such agency, would be sufficient not-
withstanding the absence in it of any indication of the existence or 
identity of the principal- the daughter's father.3 The Court ruled 
that the plaintiff-buyer had failed to allege the agency. 
The precise point on which the case turns is whether the daughter's 
signature to the memorandum as administrator of her mother's will 
is a sufficient description of herself personally and as the agent for the 
only other person interested in the will of the deceased wife, her fa-
ther. On this narrow point the majority of the Court ruled that it was 
not; hence the plaintiff had not alleged the agency necessary to have 
the memorandum bind the father. 
The plaintiff's bill alleged that the oral agreement related to the 
land described in the memorandum. It further alleged that a petition 
for a license to sell at private sale was prepared by Kathleen Picardi 
as executrix of the will of her mother, which was assented to by her fa-
ther. This later allegation could conceivably be interpreted as show-
ing agency on the part of the father to his daughter to do all things 
necessary to effect the sale of his interest and that of the daughter in 
one parcel to the plaintiff. This allegation together with the signature 
as "administrator" to a memorandum executed subsequent to the ap-
pointment of the daughter as executrix makes a plausible case for 
the plaintiff's contention that agency was alleged in the plaintiff's bill. 
A liberal view of the plaintiff's bill could lead to such a conclusion. A 
majority of the Court chose to apply the rule that on demurrer the 
language in the bill is to be construed against the pleader, and that 
nothing can be assumed in his favor. The case can be explained on 
the above ground, yet the result seems harsh. It should serve to put 
all on notice that unless all parties to be charged have signed the 
memorandum, the agency of those who sign to bind nonsignatories 
must be clearly made out. Allegation of assent to prior petitions for 
license to sell and documents of like import by nonsignatories is not 
sufficient to meet the buyer's requirement of adequately pleading 
agency. 
§5.4. Performance and damages. Massachusetts law concerning 
recovery under building contracts has developed into well-defined 
rules. A builder is precluded from recovery on the contract if he has 
21 Restatement, Agency §30 (1933). 
3 Id. §153. 
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not fully performed.1 He is allowed to sue off the contract in quan-
tum meruit if he has performed substantially and in good faith.2 
However, "in the absence of special exculpating circumstances, an 
intentional departure from the precise requirements of the contract is 
not consistent with good faith in the endeavor fully to perform it, and 
unless such departure is so trifling as to fall within de minimis, it bars 
all recovery." 3 Some confusion resulted when a combination of the 
above rules was applied in computing the amount of recovery in a 
suit by an owner against a builder who had willfully defaulted. In 
Glazer v. Schwartz4 the builder brought suit in equity to establish a 
mechanic's lien; the owner sought affirmative relief by way of dam-
ages. The builder was denied relief on the basis that he had willfully 
defaulted. The contract price for building the house was $14,700. 
After having received $13,000, the builder failed to finish the house 
according to the specifications in the contract. The value of the house 
as built was $700 less than it would have been if the builder had 
fully performed. Notwithstanding the fact that the diminution in 
value of $700 was considerably less than the remaining price stipu-
lated in the contract, the owner was granted affirmative relief in dam-
ages measured by the amount necessary to make the structure conform 
in a reasonable way to the contract. The Court's granting of affirma-
tive relief in the Schwartz case cannot be squared with settled princi-
ples of contract law concerning damages. Section 346 of the Restate-
ment of Contracts provides: "For a breach by one who has contracted 
to construct a specified product, the other party can get judgment 
for compensatory damages for all unavoidable harm that the builder 
had reason to foresee when the contract was made, less such part of the 
contract price as has not been paid and is not still payable . .." By 
way of example this rule works out as follows: Building contract 
price, $10,000. Willful failure to complete by builder after he has 
been paid $2000. Cost of completion of the building, $12,000. 
Owner's measure of recovery is $12,000 less $8000, or $4000. If the cost 
of completion is less than the amount of the unpaid price, the 
owner is not entitled to any compensatory damages.5 
Whatever aberration from settled principles of contract law was in-
troduced into Massachusetts by the Schwartz case has now been cor-
rected. In Ficara v. Belleau6 the Supreme Judicial Court refused to 
follow the Schwartz case. In the Ficara case the owner sued the con-
tractor for damages for breach of a contract by which the contractor 
had agreed to install a heating and cooling system for the contract 
price of $6200. The contractor willfully and intentionally aban-
doned the contract after having been paid $4200. The plaintiff 
§5.4. 1 See cases cited in Glazer v. Schwartz, 276 Mass. 54, 56, 176 N.E. 613, 614 
(1931). 
• Hayward v. Leonard. 7 Pick. 181 (1864). 
• Andre v. Maguire. 305 Mass. 515. 516. 26 N.E.2d 347. 348 (1940). 
'276 Mass. 54.176 N.E. 613 (1931). 
• McCormick. Damages §169 (1935). 
81954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 87. 117 N.E.2d 287. 
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had paid $2361 to another contractor to perform the remaining work. 
An auditor, whose findings of fact were final, awarded the plaintiff 
$2361. The amount of the damages was reduced to $361 by a judge 
of the Superior Court, from which judgment the plaintiff appealed. 
The Court affirmed. The arithmetic of the Restatement rule ap· 
plied to the Ficara case is cost of completion ($2361) less amount 
unpaid on the contract ($2000) equals damages to be awarded 
($361). The plaintiff's contention that the unpaid balance of the 
contract price should not be taken into account amounts to an argu-
ment that exemplary damages should be awarded in case of willful 
abandonment. The Court refused to allow such damages, adhering 
to the fundamental contract view that damages are compensatory.7 
Failure to take into account the unpaid amount of the contract price 
would put the plaintiff in a better position than he would have been 
in had there been full performance. As the Court pointed out, disal-
lowance of the unpaid portion of the contract price in computing the 
damages would result in the plaintiff's getting a $6200 heating and 
cooling system for $4200. The rules that bars the builder in case of 
willful abandonment has no application in computing the owner's 
recovery. 
• 1 Restatement, Contracts §342 (1932). 
8 Sipley v. Stickney, 190 Mass. 43, 76 N.E. 226 (1906). 
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